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"Lost Triumph" by Tom Carhart

Anyone who has read much about the battle of Gettyburg has wondered why Gen. Lee, the most able tactician in either army, saw fit to launch 15,000 or so veteran troops across a mile of open field straight into the teeth of the Union defenses on Cemetery Ridge?
Did Lee think he could entice Meade to weaken the center of this line by feinting attacks elsewhere?
Did Lee think the massive artillery bombardment of the Union lines would do enough damage to allow the Pickett-Pettigrew assault to pierce the Union "fish hook?"
Did the great general just have a really, really bad day?
Tom Carhart, in his interesting book "Lost Triumph," argues that Lee's plan unraveled disastrously for the army of Northern Virginia because a crucial portion of the operation was foiled at the last minute.
Carhart argue that Lee's intention on that July 3 day was for the infantry assault to hit the Union lines in close coordination with a massive cavalry assault on the rear of the Union position.
Carhart lays out a fascinating "what if" scenario based on the movements of Gen. JEB Stuart's cavalry command which occured at the same time as Pickett's assault was forming.
According to Carhart, Lee wanted to draw off Union manpower with an early morning feint against Culp's Hill, then blast the center of the Union line with Porter Alexander's massed artillery. The infantry would strike out across the open fields, but not before Stuart's 6,000 man or so command swung around the Union right and smashed into the center defenses from the rear. Fighting off a powerful cavalry attack would disorganize Union defenses just as the Rebel infantry drove into the center and splintered the Union Army into two halves.
If successful Lee could have assaulted the separated portions of the Army of the Potomac in detail and earned a victory so monumental that it would have forced an end to the war.
What happened, however, was that Stewart's cavaliers were fought to a standstill by horsemen under George Custer. The delicate timing of Lee's plan was wrecked and the Confederate infantry marched into a strong Union position where the waiting troops had their undivided attention. The result was the disaster for the attackers.
Carhart expains why there is little direct evidence to prove his theory and offers an impressive body of circumstantial evidence and reasonable conjecture to make his case.
It's a well-written book and likely to spark the interest of even the most jaded of Gettysburg students.