John Mosier's book "The Blitzkrieg Myth" is a fascinating and controversial rethinking of the popular history of World War II. I blitzed through it last week, drawn in by the strong writing and powerful, unconventional reasoning.
Mosier says much of what we think we know about World War II is wrong, intentionally and unintentionally mangled by historians and popular media.The common perception of why the Germans were so successful in the war's early years is based on series of distortions and outright lies. Why the Third Reich was then defeated so spectacularly is also obscured in misinformation and in the non-analytical national myth-building of the victorious countries.
For instance, Mosier says the current historical "record" tells us the Germans were able to win a series of spectacular military victories in the early years of WW2 because they unleashed a new kind of war (blitzkrieg, or as Mosier calls it, breathrough warfare). This profound new military strategy coupled with the far superior military technology of the Germans simply overwhelmed the unprepared Allies.
Bologna, Mosier says. There was little new about the overall strategy employed by the Germans in their "lightning offensives" against Poland, France and the USSR. Nor was German military technology supreme on the battlefield. For instance, the bulk of the vaunted Panzers fleet which rolled into France was lightly armed and in fact inferior in tank vs. tank combat with the more powerful French armor. German airplanes were solid, but did not dominate the skies in terms of speed or armament.
The advantages the Germans enjoyed -- the factors that led them to their crushing victory -- were superior leadership and tactics. And there was nothing revolutionary about either.
By mixing infantry, armor and air power judiciously at the tactical level, the Germans seized the early momentum against the Allies (France, Britain, Belgium) and kept up the pressure as the political will of their opponents crumbled. French politicians, though not the French Army, panicked quickly, which led Churchill to blink. Instead of rallying his Gallic ally, the British leader joined the stampede and made the hasty decision to retreat as quickly as possible to the coast for evacuation. These two dominos tumbling forced the Belgians to call it an early day -- they quit -- which only exacerbated an already disastrous strategic situation. Hitler must have been laughing in his strudel.
The war in France is only one part of the overall story Mosier has to tell. The author treads roughly on some sacred ground here and does so with all the daintiness of an angy bull. He's rough on some favorites, including many Americans' favorite general of the war, the flamboyant George Patton. The air forces of both the US and Britain also come in for sharp criticism.
Mosier's book is sure to anger many historians and history buffs, but it should be read and discussed by anyone interested in the subject matter.
Best WW2 book I'veread in awhile.
It’s Bigger Than NPR’s Katherine Maher
1 week ago
2 comments:
It's not news that the Poles, British, and French were out-generalled. Further, the German doctrine of "each rank trained to operate at one rank higher" led to initiative and leadership down to the level of corporal. Many hundreds of minor actions were won throughout the Polish and French campaigns by young Landsers who had been trained to take command and improvise if an NCO was put out of action. German officers, far from the inflexible and hidebound Prussians they are depicted as, valued individual intiative above all else. But while true that the Germans didn't "invent" the concept of what was called Blitzkreig, that did successfully apply it. And the average German general had a military training and temperment several times superior to his counterpart in the Allied armies. Outstanding Allied generals like Slim, Wingate, Eiger, and Zhukov were exceptions, but very much the rule in the German Army.
Thanks for the reply. Mosier is a strong believer in the basic superiority of the German infantry. He credits much of their success to very solid, skilled, experienced leadership, from the top ranks on down.
He does not accept the popular view of blitzkrieg, arguing (convincingly in my opinion) that "blitzkrieg" was a largely conventional tactical excellence combined with skillful propaganda.
The book delves deeply into the evolution of pre-war "grand strategy" based on massive armored breakthroughs and overwhelming airpower. His book, as much as anything, is a demolition of those ideas.
Believe me, he gives the Wermacht more than a fair hearing, much to the annoyance of many historians, I suspect.
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